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Summary 
 
This Evidence Report analyses the potential contribution of epidemic real-time monitoring 
(ERTM) initiatives to enhancing and augmenting disease surveillance systems in developing 
countries.  
 
It gathers and synthesises existing evidence from literature on infectious diseases, case 
study evaluations and expert viewpoints about how a range of ERTM initiatives have been 
used for, and added value to, epidemic early warning and early response efforts.  
 
By drawing on a range of insights from academic literature, organisational evaluations and 
practitioner perspectives, the study aims to provide a rounded picture of the potential as well 
as the limitations of real-time data for epidemic disease responses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
1 Introduction: examining the role of mobile 
real-time disease monitoring in epidemic 
surveillance  
 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), infectious diseases pose a major 
problem in many developing countries (WHO 2007). Data from the WHO’s Global Burden of 
Disease report show that in low-income countries, 38 per cent of all deaths and six of the top 
ten causes of death can be attributed to infectious diseases. In lower middle-income 
countries, 24 per cent of all deaths and five of the top ten causes of death were due to 
infectious diseases (Lozano et al. 2010). 
 
The diseases most commonly associated with developing countries include diarrhoeal 
diseases, acute respiratory infections, measles and malaria, epidemic meningococcal 
disease, tuberculosis, relapsing fever, cholera and typhus (Doherty 2013). In recent years, 
epidemics of Ebola, avian influenza, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and cholera 
have all triggered major national and international responses (Institute of Health Metrics and 
Evaluation 2013). These efforts have, in different ways, highlighted the importance of global 
disease surveillance systems as well as their weaknesses, indicating the need for novel 
ways to strengthen and augment such systems (Doherty 2013).  
 
Surveillance systems enable the ‘systematic, ongoing collection, collation and analysis of 
data for public health purposes and the timely dissemination of public health information for 
assessment and public health response’ (WHO 2005: 14). Such systems are seen as 
essential for effective disease responses, but are also frequently found to be lacking in 
coverage, accuracy and timeliness, especially in those developing countries that shoulder 
the heaviest disease burdens (Baker and Fidler 2006).  
 
In recent years, and especially in the wake of the West African Ebola crisis, more 
effective surveillance systems for epidemic early warning and response have become an 
urgent priority for the international community as a whole (Woolhouse, Rambaut and 
Kellam 2015). This need has transcended any single country or region to become a truly 
global challenge, demanding the provision of surveillance as a global public good (ibid.). 
Growing attention is now being paid to the potential of new digital technologies for 
‘augment[ing] traditional surveillance methods to acquire and disseminate information in 
real time’ (ibid.: 307).  
 
The rationale for epidemic real-time monitoring (ERTM) systems is that they have the 
potential to provide a low-cost continuous monitoring tool for epidemic-prone, disease-
specific or related unusual events. This can ensure early detection of outbreaks and 
support rapid confirmation, characterisation, response, and control measures (Institute of 
Medicine 2007). Used alongside more formal surveillance systems, ERTM systems are 
seen as crucial for strengthening overall epidemic intelligence (Barboza et al. 2013). 
 
Previous research from the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) on real-time monitoring 
(RTM) defines RTM systems as those that generate data at a higher frequency than 
traditional data, and that lead to some form of response (Greeley, Lucas and Chai 2013a). 
There is a growing body of work on RTM funded by the IDS Policy Anticipation, Response 
and Evaluation work stream. This work has shown that RTM efforts: 
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 are made possible by a combination of hardware, software and connectivity 
advances 
 are facilitated by the gathering, storage, communication, processing and recall of 
large data sets at relatively low cost 
 have considerable potential to be ‘game-changers’ in the delivery of services, 
including but not limited to health, education, energy and finance  
 have been subject to critical questions and challenges about use, functionality, 
effectiveness, distribution, inclusion and sustainability  
 can be challenging in settings where technology use is limited by infrastructure and 
awareness (Greeley et al. 2013a, Greeley et al. 2013b; Lucas, Greeley and Roelen 
2013; Joshi et al. 2014; Pueyo 2013). 
 
This study seeks to explore ERTM systems in more detail, focusing on: 
 
 design, strategy and function 
 key stakeholders and reporting relationships  
 performance and quality in absolute terms and relative to formal surveillance 
systems.  
 
Findings from across these areas will be synthesised to draw more general lessons about 
the strengths and weaknesses of ERTM initiatives, and whether or not they contribute to 
more effective and timely epidemic surveillance and, ultimately, to improved public health 
decisions and responses.  
 
It synthesises findings from three sources: evidence available from systematic reviews and 
syntheses of ERTM efforts in developing countries; evaluative evidence from specific case 
studies of ERTM efforts; and interviews with experts and practitioners involved in designing 
and implementing such systems. 
 
In taking this approach, the study aims to generate lessons for policy and practice from 
existing ERTM efforts as well as insights into how future efforts might be strengthened. As 
such, the primary audiences are policymakers and practitioners, as well as researchers on 
real-time monitoring and surveillance systems. 
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2 Epidemic real-time monitoring: 
background and context   
 
ERTM systems can be usefully seen as one example of event-based disease surveillance 
systems, in contrast to more traditional indicator-based systems (WHO 2008).  
 
This important distinction is illustrated in Figure 2.1 and is further explained below. 
Figure 2.1 Comparing event-based and indicator-based surveillance 
 
Source: Adapted from WHO (2008). 
 
As Figure 2.1 indicates, indicator-based systems are based on routine reporting of disease 
cases. They collect and analyse structured data based on established surveillance and 
monitoring protocols, which are typically tailored to different diseases. Data are reported on 
a regular basis by health-care providers and diagnostic laboratories, and collected by 
surveillance specialists in governmental health agencies. They are then subsequently 
verified through communication between the agencies and those responsible for data 
collection. The strength of such systems lies in their statistical power, and capacity to 
compare data to pre-defined thresholds for different diseases. This means that such systems 
can reliably identify increased numbers or clusters of incidence at a specific time, period, 
and/or location that might indicate an epidemic threat (Velasco et al. 2014).  
 
The weakness of indicator-based systems is that there are time lags embedded throughout 
the chain of data collection, analysis and notification, such that these systems cannot quickly 
detect potential threats. As the WHO has found, ‘When it comes to the timely detection of 
outbreaks… indicator-based surveillance systems often fail’ (WHO 2008: 4, emphasis 
added). Moreover, there are issues around the sensitivity to new or unexpected diseases, 
because, by their very nature, pre-defined indicators look for existing pathogens rather than 
novel or emerging diseases (Velasco et al. 2014).  
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Event-based surveillance is also based on the organised and rapid capture of information 
about public health risks. However, instead of relying on formal reporting systems, these 
data are increasingly gathered directly and in real time through pre-established monitoring 
and alert systems (typically implemented by community members or front-line workers), or 
through gathering publicly available data from traditional and social media channels. 
Because of this, event-based systems can detect threats not captured by indicator-based 
surveillance. They also identify events faster than traditional indicator-based procedures, 
and can detect events that occur in populations not covered by formal channels for reporting. 
Increasingly, event-based surveillance efforts make use of digital technologies to gather, 
share, manage and analyse different kinds of disease-related data in a variety of 
humanitarian and development contexts, with the aim of informing decision-makers working 
in local, national or international health systems (Velasco et al. 2014; WHO 2008). 
 
In recent years, efforts in real-time monitoring for event-based surveillance have grown 
considerably in number and scope (Morse 2012). ERTM approaches are now becoming one 
of the most widespread of all electronic health initiatives, according to the most recent 
survey of the Global Observatory for eHealth (WHO 2013). Many of these new interventions 
have been developed and tested in the context of major epidemic emergencies, including 
Ebola in West Africa, global polio outbreaks, the Haiti cholera outbreak, the Philippines 
leptospirosis, and others (Woolhouse et al. 2015).  
 
The information generated by such systems can be used across all of the five distinct stages 
of epidemic outbreak response identified by WHO guidance, namely: diagnostics and 
assessment; prevention; surveillance; outbreak control; and disease treatment and 
management (Connolly 2005). This can be a useful way of classifying ERTM systems, 
although in reality, many will cut across these functions.  
 
Another way of categorising ERTM efforts is according to their most significant sources of 
data, which influences the nature, structure and scope of such systems. Although these are 
not exclusive, most ERTM systems can be seen as relying primarily on one or other of the 
following three sources: 
 
 community volunteer systems based on simple pre-planned survey questionnaires 
distributed on mobile phones or surveys  
 health worker systems, again based on survey questionnaires, which are typically 
more sophisticated, and may use mobile phones or other forms of mobile 
technologies such as tablets or personal digital assistants (PDAs) 
 social and traditional media analysis systems, drawing on data from social media 
platforms such as Twitter, or more traditional newspaper, radio and TV media 
sources (Morse 2012).  
 
Regardless of the source, data are typically fed to a common centralised data system that 
works to collate, store and share data in real time. As well as providing basic analysis, this 
system can serve as a platform for more sophisticated analysis and, where appropriate, can 
trigger response. Despite the growing applications and a number of feasibility studies, there 
remains limited evidence on the effectiveness of ERTM systems in the context of epidemic 
outbreak surveillance. As a result, much of what is known about the contribution of such 
systems to surveillance coverage, timeliness, decision-making, and health outcomes is 
anecdotal (Charles-Smith et al. 2015). 
 
These evidence gaps need to be understood in context. First, as the London School of 
Hygiene & Tropical Medicine’s 2013 systematic review of evidence in emergency health 
efforts found, much more work is needed to advance the evidence base of managing 
epidemic responses in developing countries in general, and particularly of epidemic 
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surveillance and digital technologies (Blanchet et al. 2013). Second, event-based 
surveillance systems – of which digital RTM is just one prominent example – are poorly 
understood in developed and developing country settings alike. A recent systematic review 
of event-based surveillance systems found limited evaluations and research, with many 
interventions not being subjected to any kind of systematic analysis at any stage of 
implementation (Velasco et al. 2014).  
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3 Case study findings  
 
The six case studies reviewed below are all forms of ERTM that have been implemented in 
the past five years. The selection criteria were that all case studies should involve some form 
of real-time monitoring technology or process, all should have explicit goals to contribute to 
epidemic surveillance, and all must have been subject to some form of operational analysis 
or systematic evaluation.  
 
Because of the pace of digital developments, it was also decided to exclude case studies 
that dated from more than five years before the current study. These were identified through 
a range of mechanisms: existing knowledge, literature search, key informant referral and 
web searches.  
 
The case studies identified fit into the three broad categories of ERTM systems as follows: 
 
 community event-based surveillance efforts: Ebola response in Sierra Leone     
(2014–15); rumour tracking in Amhara, Ethiopia (2013–14) 
 front-line health worker-based digital event-based system: Surveillance in Post 
Extreme Emergencies and Disasters (SPEED) in Philippines (2012 onwards); 
cholera response in Papua New Guinea (2014) 
 social media monitoring systems: cholera response in Haiti (2010); polio globally 
(2013–14).  
 
For the first two of these categories, key findings are summarised for the specific case 
studies, drawing on evaluative evidence synthesis and expert interviews. For each case 
study, three broad elements are explored: 
 
 design, strategy and function 
 key stakeholders and reporting relationships  
 performance and quality. 
 
For the third category (social media), the approaches were subject to retrospective data 
analysis, looking at the quality of their data comparative to official sources, but not to 
operational analysis, and describing how these data were utilised in decision-making. As 
such, these case studies are shorter, have less specific details about the use of information 
by stakeholders, and are therefore more focused on the relative strength and potential use of 
the data generated. 
3.1  Community event-based surveillance systems, Sierra Leone 
and Ethiopia  
3.1.1 Design, strategy and function 
Community event-based surveillance (CEBS) interventions are based on the real-time 
capture of information from communities – typically through networks of volunteers – about 
events that pose public health risks. This information is then transmitted by a variety of 
mechanisms to intermediaries, who will verify information and, where necessary, notify 
health authorities. 
 
In Sierra Leone, the CEBS was designed and implemented by the International Rescue 
Committee (IRC), the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the district 
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health authority. The system was initially piloted across 100 villages in Bo district, starting in 
November 2014 at the height of the Ebola outbreak, and continuing for another nine months. 
The design went through an iterative process, with an initial pilot phase leading to the 
development of standard operating procedures (SOPs) that could support scale-up. These 
SOPs were reviewed and approved for national scale-up by the national surveillance pillar 
and incorporated into the national Ebola surveillance strategy, being scaled up to other 
districts through the Ebola Response Consortium (ERC). From the pilot application in one 
district, since January 2015, the ERC has supported the Ministry of Health to implement 
CEBS in nine of the country’s 14 districts. The Sierra Leone Red Cross Society (IFRC) is 
supporting CEBS in an additional three districts (ERC 2015). 
 
The Sierra Leone system aimed to improve early identification of cases of Ebola virus 
disease (EVD), reduce Ebola transmission among communities, and enhance the response. 
It would do this by identifying emerging clusters of EVD transmission at the earliest possible 
stage and communicating information about potential EVD transmission to district-level 
Ebola Response Committees. The overall objective was to increase the timeliness with 
which suspected EVD cases were identified, isolated, and provided with the appropriate care 
(ibid.). 
 
In Ethiopia, the initiative took place in Amhara region, in the north-west. It started out as a 
front-line worker event-based surveillance system, initiated by the Ethiopian Federal Ministry 
of Health, with the expectation that regional, zonal and district health offices would provide 
information from the front line. However, poor take-up led to an adaptation to the approach, 
and the initiative was re-designed to become a community volunteer system, looking 
specifically at gathering and analysing rumours of disease. Funded by the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the system was rolled out across 22 study districts 
in three zones with a total population of 4.5 million, involving 59 sites (Toyama, Ota and 
Beyene 2015).  
 
The Amhara work did not have a specific focal disease, nor was there a specific overarching 
goal. Instead, it set out to collect rumours in the community and register them in central 
systems. At the outset of the programme, the structure of reporting was established, 
involving electronic data collection and analysis protocols. 
3.1.2 Stakeholders and relationships  
The Sierra Leone CEBS programme was based on local volunteers selected from within 
communities and trained to detect and report on a number of Ebola-specific trigger events to 
community health monitors. Through mobile phone networks, this trigger is then shared with 
the village surveillance supervisor who alerts the district Ebola response centre, typically 
making the journey in person by motorcycle. The district centre operatives then dispatch a 
case investigation team to verify the trigger (ERC 2015). 
 
In the Ethiopia CEBS programme, the community members formed ‘health development 
armies’, a volunteer-based community health team with a network structure of one volunteer 
per five households. These members collected health-related information from households, 
and reported any communicable disease outbreaks and unusual health events to health 
centres, emphasising events with multiple deaths from unknown causes. Volunteers were 
also mobilised for verification of the rumours in the community when needed (Toyama et al. 
2015).  
3.1.3 Performance and quality  
In Sierra Leone, a three-month accompanying evaluation in nine ERC districts focused on 
how well the CEBS structure was working and its sensitivity and timeliness in detecting new 
confirmed cases. This was done through extensive interviews with participants throughout 
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the CEBS system as well as analysis of real-time alert data to assess quantity, type and 
confirmation of alerts.  
 
After five months, in June 2015, more than 7,000 community health monitors and almost 150 
surveillance supervisors had been trained, generating more than 3,400 real-time alerts. The 
CEBS was found to have been involved in 58 per cent of confirmed EVD cases from districts 
with active transmission in a five-week period, and in 60 per cent of cases that originated 
from unknown chains of transmission. Of these cases, the time from onset to detection was 
two to three days when detected by the CEBS system and up to seven days for other 
systems. 
 
The evaluation found a good level of use and understanding of the system among 
community-level data gatherers and data aggregators. Among district partners, however, 
knowledge of the system varied, with less than 60 per cent of representatives demonstrating 
an understanding of its core structure and function.  
 
There were numerous challenges, including malfunctioning of the mobile phone system that 
was set up for the CEBS and through which alerts were shared. In addition, a lack of 
motorbikes to facilitate travel between villages was also a major issue for the surveillance 
data aggregators. This had the potential to prevent the rapid and efficient flow of information 
through the system – an outcome that was mitigated by community volunteers using their 
own personal phones (instead of those provided by the initiative) and their own 
transportation to undertake verification and reporting.  
 
While almost three-quarters of district partners reported that they thought CEBS had 
benefited the districts, there were many concerns about financial sustainability and 
incomplete coverage. There were also issues about the need for better coordination with 
other district-level health players, and how the system could be expanded to cover other 
diseases.  
 
Overall, the Sierra Leone CEBS effort served as a valuable component of the surveillance 
system, helping to detect new cases, and providing sensitive and timely detection of cases 
from unknown chains of transmission. By ruling out suspect cases, it also confirmed zero 
transmission in quiet districts (ERC 2015). The evaluation report found that continued 
engagement with communities and local leaders will be essential to build community trust in 
the system; and that for CEBS to be sustained, it would need to be more fully integrated 
within the structures and processes of the official health system.  
 
The Ethiopia work ran between October 2013 and November 2014 and was subject to an 
evaluation throughout this period. Across the pilot districts, almost 2,000 events were 
reported, of which 64 per cent were verified and found to be genuine public health events. 
Most common rumours were about measles outbreaks, rabies, anthrax, whooping cough 
and polio. The most commonly reported rumours were measles-related (71 per cent). The 
measles rumours followed a similar pattern of measles cases reported in the routine 
surveillance system. However, there were eight times as many verified rabies cases through 
the CEBS system as through the routine system, and 2.5 times as many anthrax cases 
(Toyama et al. 2015). 
 
Of the total epidemic or disease rumours registered, the average event reporting time was 
3.8 days and the response time for health centres was 0.6 days, resulting in a total response 
time of 4.4 days. Responses included case management, active case finding and 
vaccination. The largest proportion of rumours were reported by community members, but 
there were also some cases of health workers acting as intermediaries for the reports, after 
being informed by community members (ibid.). 
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The CEBS system was established alongside an existing indicator-based surveillance 
system and was seen as simple and easy to implement. The implementation cost was 
minimal, requiring only the distribution of rumour data tools to the health centres, brief 
orientations to community focal points, and training of centralised data managers. Volunteers 
had already been trained and the overall cost of the system was viewed as very low, 
requiring only brief orientations as the programme was implemented. Community 
acceptance of the system was high, reflecting the fact that the majority of rumours came 
from community members even though there were no incentives to report (ibid.). 
 
However, the evaluators identified limited capacity to respond to the rumoured events, and 
recommended more investment and capacity to provide prompt responses alongside the 
ERTM implementation. Without such efforts, buy-in to and acceptance of the ERTM system 
could erode over time as the community loses faith that the system will, in fact, trigger 
improvements in services (ibid.). 
3.2  Health worker ERTM systems  
Health worker ERTM systems are distinct from community-based systems because they are 
typically more sophisticated, involve more detailed reporting criteria and data gathering, and 
are usually designed to be a formal part of the health surveillance system. Here, we look at 
two mobile phone-based case studies: one in the Philippines, which focuses on epidemic 
surveillance in disasters (SPEED); and one in Papua New Guinea, which is more generally 
focused on surveillance.  
3.2.1 Design, strategy and function 
The Surveillance in Post Extreme Emergencies and Disasters (SPEED) project emerged 
from a collaboration between WHO and the Philippines Department of Health in 2010, 
focused on the development of a mobile technology-based early warning disease 
surveillance system for post-disaster situations (WHO 2014). After Typhoon Ketsana, which 
hit in 2009, Manila saw the largest ever outbreak of leptospirosis (Amilasan et al. 2012). 
Subsequently, WHO’s Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) identified the 
need for an effective monitoring system for early detection of unusual increases in major 
public health events during emergencies in the Philippines. In collaboration with the 
Philippine Department of Health, the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), AusAid and the Government of Finland, WHO worked to create SPEED as a tool 
for infectious disease preparedness and response (SPEED 2011a). 
 
The basic principle of SPEED is the use of web-based software technology to receive data 
via Short Message Service (SMS) from all parts of the country. These data can be 
aggregated and used at different levels and in different regions. The front-line component of 
the Philippines disaster response structures are local disaster evaluation areas; health 
workers operating in these areas play a critical role in populating SPEED with data. SPEED 
reporting forms, loaded onto mobile phones and tablets, enable the capture of essential 
information during consultations with members of affected communities. The system is set 
up to undertake surveillance and monitoring of 21 identified disease entities or health events 
that are common in emergencies or disasters (SPEED 2011b).  
 
Since 2010, SPEED has been used in a number of disasters, including after Typhoons 
Quiel, Washin, Haiyan and Ruby. The largest single deployment was after Typhoon Haiyan 
in 2013, which led to serious concern about possible disease outbreaks. Aid resources were 
directed to the Department of Health to enhance emergency disease surveillance systems, 
including resources for deploying SPEED.  
 
In Papua New Guinea, following a series of epidemics with high mortality rates and poor 
surveillance responses, including an ongoing national cholera outbreak, the health 
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authorities piloted a mobile phone-based ERTM system that aimed to enhance the 
timeliness of outbreak detection (Rosewell et al. 2013). Some effort was already being made 
to gather information about potential high-risk events through ad hoc and rumour reports 
transmitted through the health information system. The Mobile Phone-based Syndromic 
Surveillance System (MOPBASSS) was piloted in two health centres in Port Moresby in 
2010, then scaled up nationally during 2011. The pilot intervention included the provision of 
data collection tools, a one-day on-site training, sample collection materials, guidelines, and 
mobile phones.  
 
MOPBASSS set out with the objectives of: identifying acute disease events in a more timely 
fashion; establishing baseline data for public health syndromes; strengthening the links 
between clinical services and outbreak response; and complementing existing event-based 
and routine surveillance systems. It sought to cover a number of syndromes, including 
influenza-like illnesses, acute water diarrhoea, bloody diarrhoea, prolonged fever, acute 
fever, haemorrhagic fever, and outbreaks of unexplained disease or deaths (ibid.). 
3.2.2 Stakeholders and relationships  
In the Philippines, front-line health workers operating in evacuation centres and other sites 
are the primary collectors of surveillance information, which they enter into the SPEED 
system using mobile SMS messaging. All the information is stored in the national SPEED 
server, allowing aggregated data to be viewed and analysed by health managers and 
regional and national decision-makers. The system allows online data validation and 
automatic generation of necessary reports. This enables the rapid transmission of a range of 
syndromic disease information from local evacuation centres to national levels of the health 
system. Users can also create graphs, spreadsheets and maps to support early warning and 
decision-making about possible disease outbreaks and feasible responses. The system also 
has a built-in capacity to alert users if certain diseases go beyond specific epidemic 
thresholds. In the case of SPEED, actors outside the humanitarian sector – from the private 
sector, national governments, local governments, community-based organisations and 
national health providers – have played a central role in the design and deployment of the 
system, and its continual refinement (WHO 2014; Tante et al. 2015). 
 
In Papua New Guinea, MOPBASSS stakeholders included surveillance focal points from the 
pilot sites (predominantly outpatient nurse coordinators and paediatricians), disease control 
staff from the provincial health offices, and national surveillance staff. When an acute event 
presents at one of the pilot health facilities, the health worker first documents and tallies 
those events on paper, and submits summary information via the standardised mobile phone 
templates. This information is then sent by the surveillance focal point, either on an urgent 
basis for selected high-risk syndromes, or on a weekly basis for others.  
 
In parallel, samples are collected and sent for laboratory investigations, and results are also 
shared with the different stakeholders. Information is stored in an online database managed 
by a private sector operator, and is accessed by provincial and national health officers via a 
series of automatically generated reports. The MOPBASSS system sends automated 
messages to relevant parties throughout the data reporting, collecting and analysis process 
to trigger specific processes and activities such as reporting events to the next level, 
collecting samples, filling out lab forms, and so on. A weekly email bulletin is sent to all 
participating stakeholders, summarising events, analysis and relevant actions (Rosewell et 
al. 2013).  
3.2.3 Performance and quality  
For the initial four months of the Haiyan response, SPEED was implemented in 411 health 
facilities in the affected areas. More than 300 staff received training in how to use the system 
from WHO, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the International Medical Corps 
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(IMC) and others; and more than 340,000 consultations were reported, generating 
approximately 3,000 SPEED early warning signals. Every single one of these led to 
responses to prevent possible outbreaks, ranging from specific health treatments to 
stockpiling of drugs and advocacy efforts.  
 
However, local acceptance may not be as high as imagined. Surveys of 45 government 
health officers from areas affected by Haiyan in March 2014, which focused on the 
effectiveness of surveillance systems, found that SPEED had not always been activated in a 
timely fashion (Tante et al. 2015). The functionality of the SPEED system varied 
considerably across the different regions and provinces/cities. Some respondents were not 
confident of its functionality because they had encountered various difficulties when using it. 
Some of these difficulties – lack of proficiency in performing the syndromic approach and 
reverting to paper-based reporting due to power and network failures – have also been 
reported for other, similar systems.  
 
Most respondents reported that SPEED complemented existing systems in such a manner 
that it guided the health officers to verify and validate the particular syndromes and the areas 
affected for possible outbreaks. While SPEED was seen as potentially useful in future 
disasters or emergencies, realising this potential needs better capacity building among front-
line health workers, which goes beyond courses to cover simulations and mentoring. 
 
An independent review of SPEED conducted for AusAid found that the system’s direct 
operational costs were ‘astonishingly low’ (Keene 2012: 4). This needs to be offset against 
other costs that may be harder to calculate, such as labour costs for additional activities, 
costs of training local workers, and so on. These additional investments were such that while 
SPEED was considered ‘very relevant to other countries and international agencies… such a 
comprehensive effort would probably not be successful in countries with relatively low 
human and capital resources’ (Keene 2012: 270). 
 
MOPBASSS used a number of established frameworks to evaluate whether the system was 
meeting its objectives. Stakeholder experience was investigated by using standardised 
questionnaires and focus groups. For measles, the system was found to be more timely (2.4 
vs 84 days), more complete (70 per cent vs 40 per cent) and more sensitive (95 per cent vs 
26 per cent) than existing systems. The validity of the system was also high, with all 
outbreaks identified through alternative systems also being identified through MOPBASSS 
(Rosewell et al. 2013). 
 
Stakeholders found the MOPBASSS system to be fast, simple, effective and reliable, 
enabling the timely initiation of verification, assessment and response processes. All 
stakeholders were keen to continue their participation; and the majority reported that 
MOPBASSS was working effectively to detect acute public health events. Participation in 
MOPBASSS was not associated with an excessive time burden, and the programme was 
seen as complementing existing systems (ibid.). 
 
Timely access to data through the internet-based database was beneficial for national staff, 
but data access was challenging for provincial staff. In some situations, landline telephone or 
high-frequency radio might have been the preferred and faster option for providing the real-
time report for selected conditions (ibid.). 
 
The RTM data from MOPBASSS were used mainly by national health authorities to support 
assessments about disease patterns that would not have been possible otherwise. Over the 
pilot period, MOPBASSS outputs were predominantly used for risk assessments at the 
weekly surveillance meeting of the national health authorities. For example, the system gave 
national decision-makers a certain degree of reassurance that cholera was not circulating at 
reporting sites during the ongoing national outbreak. It was suggested that establishing the 
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system during the nationwide cholera outbreak in Papua New Guinea could have enhanced 
the programme’s acceptability because the threat level and the perceived value of early 
detection were high, and national authorities were incentivised to work in real time. Such use 
was not observed or reported at the provincial level.  
 
The evaluation concluded that the investment in MOPBASSS, at some US$45,000, was very 
good value for money and cost effective in comparison to traditional surveillance 
investments. It was noted that a post-pilot investment would need to be larger in order to 
address some of the gaps around real-time analysis of samples and related communications 
(ibid.). 
3.3  Social media for surveillance  
Thanks to technological developments, there are growing numbers of digital surveillance 
systems that gather information from informal data sources such as news, social media, web 
searches and other collaborative systems. These data can be used for early analysis and 
disease detection. 
 
One of the most prominent tools for social media reporting is HealthMap, an automated 
surveillance platform that continually identifies, characterises and maps events of public 
health and medical importance, including outbreaks and epidemics. Information sources for 
HealthMap include news media and discussion groups. HealthMap also incorporates data 
from the community through the ‘Outbreaks Near Me’ mobile phone application, wherein any 
user may contribute reports via their phone or online via the website.  
 
These two case studies look at the use of HealthMap and related tools in the post-
earthquake cholera outbreak in Haiti, and the same set of tools for assessing global polio 
outbreaks as well as disease outbreaks globally. Because of the nature of this work and the 
related research, these are shorter and lighter touch than the other, more operational case 
studies. 
3.3.1 Design, strategy and function  
After the post-earthquake Haiti cholera outbreak in the autumn of 2010, there were extensive 
efforts to find and supplement information already gathered about the disease dynamics 
through official sources. This involved an increase in active surveillance, especially in French 
language feeds, and work with partners in the United States and on the ground in Haiti. 
HealthMap was routinely updated through automated sources, and additional data gathered 
about the outbreak were added into the HealthMap system by individual curators. After the 
outbreak had subsided, this effort was subject to retrospective analysis by a team of 
researchers from Harvard University, who sought to compare the HealthMap data to official 
sources for the duration of the outbreak (Chunara, Andrews and Brownstein 2012). 
 
Separately, retrospective research has been undertaken to identify polio cases globally in 
2013–14, and work out the lag times between HealthMap data and WHO announcements 
(Anema et al. 2014). A similar piece of work was undertaken for HealthMap globally, looking 
at reports from June to December 2012 (Bahk et al. 2015).  
3.3.2 Stakeholders and relationships  
There was no analysis of stakeholders or the use of data in either published case study.  
3.3.3 Performance and quality  
Using HealthMap data, the Haiti research team worked to undertake an ex-post assessment 
of the correlation of volume of cholera-related news media reports and Twitter postings via 
the HealthMap system with government cholera cases reported in the first 100 days of the 
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2010 outbreak. The research found that trends in volume of informal sources significantly 
correlated in time with official case data and were available up to two weeks earlier. They 
were also able to use the data to make comparable and timely estimates of key metrics of 
disease dynamics, including the rate of disease spread (Chunara et al. 2012).  
 
This correlation between informal and formal data was especially good during the initial 
stages of an outbreak or relevant event, which demonstrated how informal data can be used 
to gain early insight into an evolving epidemic. The social media sources also allowed finer 
temporal analysis than the government data, even at the level of specific days. As a result, 
estimates derived from these data sources can be generated very early and often, with the 
potential to precede insights available from official sources. However, the correlation 
between informal media sources and case numbers was not significant later in the epidemic, 
which is a limitation of this method in the late stage of epidemics. 
 
It was also noted by the Haiti researchers that informal data sources could contain biases. 
These range from geographic biases driven by technological prevalence (social media is 
more likely to emanate from and be about urban centres and more developed regions) to 
reporting biases (data contributed are likely to be more prevalent from certain age, gender or 
other demographic groups) and false positives (with some social reports based on false 
alerts, rumours, or misreporting, particularly in situations of fear or panic).  
 
In separate research on all seven WHO-reported polio outbreaks in 2013 and 2014, digital 
reports using data analysis and illness mapping preceded official reports by an average of 
14.6 days. In two outlier cases, this lag was as much as 51 days (Cameroon, in 2013) and 
88 days (Guinea, 2014). WHO information suggests 184 cases worldwide, with most in 
Pakistan. But HealthMap searches put the total number of polio cases in 2014 at 295. 
 
A similar piece of work looked at HealthMap more broadly for a shorter time period (June to 
December 2012) and identified 111 outbreaks, using first the formal source report and then 
the data collated via HealthMap. The reports from both the official and HealthMap sources 
were compared for timeliness and content. The research found that the informal sources 
were around 1.5 days faster than the formal sources, but the difference was as great as     
51 days in some settings. Moreover, in over 60 per cent of cases, the informal social media 
and formal sources provided the same information (Bahk et al. 2015).  
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4 Conclusions: strengths and weaknesses of 
ERTM systems  
 
Drawing on the case study assessments, this section seeks to set out the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of ERTM systems. These were identified through comparative analysis of 
the case studies above, and subsequently verified through a series of interviews conducted 
with expert informants from numerous organisations working on epidemic responses, 
including a number involved in the case study examples.  
4.1 Strengths 
 
1.  Effective ERTM systems can produce event-based public health information 
that is typically more timely than routine systems while being of comparable 
quality  
 
Across the case studies, the ERTM systems generated data that are of comparable quality 
and accuracy to traditional systems. The benefit in terms of timeliness was typically in the 
order of days, but in some cases the data were available weeks or even months earlier than 
data from traditional systems. This was a common finding across all six case studies, and is 
a major positive for ERTM efforts. However, this finding does need to be qualified: ERTM 
systems can generate the data, but there has to be some form of subsequent verification, 
which in low-capacity settings is not always straightforward. However, with such verification 
built in, the ERTM systems can produce information that is comparable to official sources in 
terms of quality, especially in the early stages of an outbreak.  
 
2.  ERTM systems can be more sensitive to new and emerging cases of diseases 
and novel diseases  
 
By their very nature, ERTM systems are more sensitive to new and emerging cases of 
diseases that may not be captured by routine systems. The openness of such systems to 
data and information beyond pre-specified syndromes means they can capture fuller 
information. All of the case study systems were shown to capture information and data that 
were missed by traditional systems.  
 
3.  ERTM systems complement existing surveillance functionality  
 
In all of the case studies, the ERTM system served best as a means of complementing 
existing systems. Although they can generate information where there is little available, or in 
situations like disasters where traditional systems may not be functional, it is also important 
to highlight that ERTM systems should not generally be used to fill gaps and weaknesses in 
existing surveillance systems. 
 
4.  ERTM systems can be low cost  
 
Open-source or volunteered information means that the initial operating costs of ERTM 
systems can be extremely low when compared to routine systems. For example, almost all 
of the systems outlined here were seen to be low cost or very low cost in subsequent 
evaluations. However, the lower financial operating costs do not always take into account 
training time, volunteer time, and time taken to establish the necessary institutional 
relationships.  
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4.2 Weaknesses 
 
1.  ERTM systems tend to be small scale and technologically driven 
 
A common issue identified across the case studies and respondents was that there was a 
proliferation of efforts for applying real-time technologies to disease monitoring. While 
adapting to context is seen as a good thing in general, the highly fragmented nature of 
ERTM efforts was seen as diminishing the overall value of such work. Instead of finding 
ways in which to apply existing tools to address event-based surveillance needs in a 
sustained fashion, there is a common view that new systems are continually being designed 
and developed with more of an emphasis on technology push. 
 
The focus on technology in many ERTM systems in epidemic responses – which can often 
be at the cost of other aspects such as user acceptance and information utilisation – can 
lead to lower levels of effectiveness and efficiency, and ultimately diminish the potential 
contribution of these interventions. The result is a large number of systems that cannot be 
shared or applied outside original contexts and programme settings. 
 
2.  Poor collaboration across operational organisations  
 
Related to the above point, despite the collaborative potential of digital technologies, this is 
not always apparent among those organisations implementing ERTM systems. Instead, 
different players tend to develop their own solutions and processes, leading to high risk of 
duplication and replication. This also places clear barriers on scale, because of the potential 
reluctance of organisations to use tools and data that have been developed by others. This 
can lead to fragmented analysis of epidemic impact, and miscommunication. 
 
3.  General lack of community and end-user involvement  
 
Respondents noted that of the ERTM systems they were aware of, very few started with 
end-user or community perspectives. Overall, there has not always been sufficient attention 
paid to involving all stakeholders – especially communities, but also health workers, civil 
society, private sector and government bodies – in the design, development or 
implementation of ERTM systems. For example, few of the case study initiatives were seen 
as seeking to learn from the experiences of data collectors during implementation.  
 
In many settings, the protocols and indicators around which data gathering occurs are 
determined by external actors, rather than by community members. The data gathered are 
therefore often free of any context to support broader learning about how communities 
perceive and deal with health-related events. Related to this, many ERTM systems also pay 
scant attention to issues of access, voice and representation around data gathering. For 
example, it may be that the general dominance of specific user groups (e.g. males, younger 
people, higher-income users) shapes what data are gathered and how. Although issues of 
bias in ERTM systems are mentioned, they are not subject to a great deal of analysis. None 
of the case studies addressed issues of privacy and data protection.  
 
4.  Poor technical and data skills  
 
Many ERTM systems generate large amounts of data that can be difficult to effectively 
manage, analyse and use. As noted above, while the costs of gathering data for ERTM 
systems can be relatively low, the costs of verification can be prohibitively high. There is also 
a challenge for how these data can be analysed and aggregated to make sense of emerging 
events in real time. As a result, data from such sources are prone to misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation.  
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There is a major challenge around validation of large ‘noisy’ data sets in real time, which has 
proved restrictive for many organisations involved in ERTM systems. Cross-validation with 
other sources is possible, but can be challenging to achieve in real time.  
 
More generally, in many cases, ERTM systems build on tools that were designed for use in 
non-epidemic, high-resource settings. This relates to both the software and the hardware 
dimensions, and can lead to considerable challenges in implementation processes. There 
may be requirements to configure systems, undertake initial data assessments, or check 
issues with software deployments – all of which may require support time and resources not 
readily available in epidemic-affected and low-resource countries. Such challenges were 
identified in a number of the case studies. 
 
5.  Lack of focus on use  
 
Across all of the case studies, evidence of ERTM data use was limited. Operational staff and 
managers are seen as having many different sources of information on which to base their 
decisions, and ERTM is often hard to get into usable form.  
 
For some, ERTM efforts and event-based surveillance data more generally are mired in a 
vicious circle: there is a lack of evidence around their value, which means there is limited 
investment in such systems, which in turn limits the scope for strengthening the evidence 
base.  
 
Where risk assessment systems and structures are already in place, such as during an 
existing epidemic response situation, ERTM systems can be introduced in a timely and 
efficient manner, and serve to complement the range of information being used for decision-
making. When implemented in ways that align with pre-existing arrangements, ERTM 
systems find much greater acceptability and utilisation.  
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5 Reflections and suggestions  
 
As this study is about real-time monitoring systems, it may seem curious to close by 
discussing a series of time delays. However, based on the above findings, the effective 
use of ERTM systems for augmenting surveillance in disease outbreaks is critically 
dependent on better understanding, exploiting and addressing a number of time delays 
that have been identified in this study.  
 
The first time delay of importance is the one identified consistently in all of the case 
studies: the reporting delay between the disease-related reports produced by ERTM 
systems and those produced by more formal systems. This time delay was observed to 
varying extents in all of the case studies, and it forms the basis of continued investments 
in ERTM systems. Based on the findings above, the existence of this time delay – and 
the related evidence about quality of the data being generated – makes it clear that there 
is a very good case for continuing to develop and test ERTM systems in epidemic 
settings. But more evidence is needed about this delay, in terms of how it works in 
different settings, what compromises it involves in terms of data quality, and so on. The 
potential benefits of exploiting this positive time delay need to be better understood.  
 
The second time delay is the decision-making delay that has also been apparent in all of 
the case studies. One of the positive features of ERTM systems is that they are faster, less 
formal and bureaucratic, and can be more sensitive than formal systems. But because of this 
informality, there is also a risk that ERTM systems do not trigger a clear, unambiguous 
response among key actors. This leads to a delay between the gathering and transmission 
of ERTM information, and the triggering of some kind of recognisable response. This delay 
was also evident to some extent in all of the case studies and can be attributed to a variety 
of reasons: competing data, diverse narratives, lack of understanding, lack of verification, 
lack of capacity and investment, lack of resources, and vested interests – all of which serve 
to inhibit or prevent real-time (or near real-time) decision-making. The successes of the 
ERTM systems in our case studies seem due as much – if not more – to the institutional 
arrangements for gathering and using real-time data as to technological innovations. Put 
simply, real-time monitoring initiatives do not do well in structures and processes that are not 
set up to be real time. That said, the challenges of using ERTM data more widely point to the 
vital importance and urgency of making adjustments to enhance the responsiveness of 
existing health system decision-making processes and firmly anchoring ERTM efforts within 
them. 
 
This leads us to the third and final kind of delay, which is the institutional adaptation delay. 
It is apparent that there may be a disconnect between the growing use of ERTM systems 
and the kinds of institutions and incentives structures that are needed to support their use. 
As already noted, the successes of ERTM efforts are shaped by the institutional 
arrangements for gathering and using real-time data. New technologies have always been 
disseminated more quickly than institutions are able to adapt, and have posed challenges to 
those institutions. The delay between the introduction of technologies and the institutional 
changes needed to exploit those technologies determines how quickly their benefits can be 
generated. Generally speaking, as has been found with a whole host of digital innovations, 
technological benefits are only incremental until institutional changes are made.  
 
Given the common time delays between advances in technology and changes in institutions, 
it is to be hoped that such institutional changes will eventually come about in the context of 
ERTM initiatives and health systems, and that widespread public health benefits will result. 
Future success in this area is arguably as dependent on investing in the latest digital tools 
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and systems as it is on recognising and engaging with the political nature of the necessary 
reform processes in national and local health systems. For this to happen, the advocates 
and champions of real-time monitoring innovations need to start to pay more careful and 
sustained attention to the political economy around the benefits and changes they are 
working towards. If this does not happen, these benefits are likely to come about in a much 
longer timeframe than is typically promised.  
5.1  Ideas for future consideration 
Based on our reflections, we put forward a number of suggestions and ideas.  
 
1. There is a need for better operational research and development for ERTM 
because, at present, there is not enough attention being paid to evidence-based 
iteration and adaptation. An important element of this is to ensure effective evaluation 
and lesson learning, which require the development of better shared metrics for 
assessing the added value of ERTM in the context of public health surveillance in 
humanitarian crises, and the related need for appropriate indicators with which to 
evaluate ERTM efforts. 
2. There should be efforts to develop more formal, evidence-based operating 
procedures, tools and guidance for ERTM in event-based surveillance. This should 
include work that is urgently needed on ERTM data quality standards, screening 
and verification guidelines. 
3. Where ERTM systems work, it is because they are firmly grounded in institutional 
and social contexts. This is not a limitation, but is the source of their value and utility. 
More work is needed in this regard to understand the incentives of actors throughout 
the system, ranging from how ERTM information is already used (or not used) by 
decision-makers, and the incentives for such use, to better understanding of 
community/front-line worker engagement, acceptance and uptake. ERTM efforts 
need to work to establish ownership and acceptance of national, district and 
community-level stakeholders from the outset. When this happens, it is more likely to 
lead to systems that are well used and sustainable. 
4. There is a need to engage with and draw on the skills and capabilities of non-
traditional actors – those who may not always be regarded as integral to public 
health surveillance. For example, private sector operators played an important role in 
data management in many of the successful case studies.  
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